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ABSTRACT Since the emergence of the Bitcoin cryptocurrency, the blockchain technology has become
the new Internet tool with which researchers claim to be able to solve any existing online problem.
From immutable log ledger applications to authorisation systems applications, the current technological
consensus implies that most of Internet problems could be effectively solved by deploying some form of
blockchain environment. Regardless this ‘consensus’, there are decentralised Internet-based applications
on which blockchain technology can actually solve several problems and improve the functionality of
these applications. The development of these new blockchain-based solutions is grouped into a new
paradigm called Blockchain 3.0 and its concepts go far beyond the well-known cryptocurrencies. In
this paper, we study the current trends in the application of blockchain on the paradigm of Public Key
Infrastructures (PKI). In particular, we focus on how these current trends can guide the exploration of a
fully Decentralised Identity System, with blockchain as be part of the core technology.
INDEX TERMS BKI, Blockchain, Decentralised, Identity Management, PKI, Smart-Contracts.

I. INTRODUCTION

The need to establish unique identities for the Internet has
existed for a very long time insofar as users need to interact
with different products and services, and to validate the
users’ identities with an authority, a server or a government
entity. This means that, whoever the user is, he always needs
to have a virtual identifier that is not only reliable for that
user, but also for all users on the network [1]. Indeed, the
most common and easiest way to have an identity is to
receive it from a centralised entity. The latter is not only
able to certify the user’s identity, but also to certify that the
identities of other users are trustworthy [2]. However, there
are several security conditions that make this centralised
approach insecure and untrustworthy. Beyond the fact that
each centralized entity can be a single point of failure for
all of its dependents, the distrust of any Trusted Third Party
(TTP) is due to the fact that users do not have the freedom
they need to promote or preserve on the Internet. In the
context of PKI, the compromise of a CA will break the trust
in all certificates issued by that CA and its descendants.

The Certificate Transparency project [3] makes it more
difficult for a compromised CA to issue false but valid
certificates without being detected. Nevertheless, it cannot
detect whether a certificate has been issued to fraudulent but
not impersonating websites.
The development of the blockchain technology has become a very promising option for decentralising online
services. One of the particularly important considerations
is the creation of a new way to have time-immutable
information on the network. The ability to store immutable
information is a powerful property that enables new ways
of understanding not only an identity management as a
concept but also most of the features of the Internet, such
as data tampering that remains one of the main security
threats on the Internet. Several reviews and surveys on
blockchain [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] have been performed,
with a focus on: a) how the ledger is implemented, b)
what type of blockchain technology is implemented, c) what
types of security features and technologies are used, and d)
what the possible flaws found in existing implementations
1
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are. However, none of these surveys described the way
the blockchain could be used as a management tool in
the so-called Blockchain 3.0 technologies, which are being
used to solve current problems beyond cryptocurrencies and
financial affairs [11].
The main contributions of this survey are to a) analyse the implementations of blockchain as a Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) or PKI-added system, and b) to provide
insight into how blockchain is used from the perspective of
decentralised identity creation and management without the
need of using TTPs. The survey also presents a review of
the blockchain and PKI backgrounds and an overview of
their security flaws Furthermore, it is presented an analysis
of the current trends over the mentioned technologies. The
aforementioned works analyse the implementations, theoretical and practical, and with that information we analyse the
existing flaws in decentralised identity implementations, like
pseudo decentralisation or some dependency on centralised
entities. Finally, we present developments to be considered
as missing in order to achieve a full decentralised identity
service on the Internet.
The remaining of this paper is organised as follows.
Section II explains why the current identity technologies are
merging to find a new way to understand and implement
identity management systems. This implies the study of
decentralised identity concepts and how they are reflected in
different systems where users have most of the control of the
process of creating and storing their certificates. Section III
presents an analysis on how existing works use blockchain
to solve identity problems on the Internet. Finally, section
IV concludes the survey and outlines future work.
II. BLOCKCHAIN WITH PKI

One of the main achievements of Bitcoin’s development
[12] was the creation of a ledger capable of storing all
transactions via peer-to-peer methods, making them public
and transparent to every user on the network. This was the
best way to avoid having a centralized management system
to review and validate transactions: [13] [14] [15]. Since
then, two branches of this new technology called blockchain
have been developed: the first is based on the transactions
represented by bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, and is
known as Blockchain 1.0 [11]. The second is based on the
storage of several types of information and programmable
features, also known as the smart contract paradigm or
Blockchain 2.0 [16], of which Ethereum is the main representative. These two developments are applications of the
same principle: an interconnected succession of information
storage blocks linked to the previous one by cryptographic
tools that make the chain an immutable ledger.
With the evolution of Blockchain 2.0, called Blockchain
3.0 (based on advanced smart contracts) [11], several new
implementations of blockchain have emerged that aim to diversify the application of the decentralized ledger. However,
all Blockchain 3.0 applications retain the main characteristics of the ledger, in which the transparency of the stored

data remains. This makes the information safe and trustworthy, but it is not private by default. This can be considered
a security flaw from the perspective of the information
owners. Therefore, owners can implement some existing
solutions to maintain the security of the information in an
off-chain storage system, as shown in [4] [17] [18] [19],
or they can keep the information encrypted inside the
blockchain, as shown in [20], and use the blockchain to
ensure the digest of this information in order to preserve
the improvements of Blockchain 3.0 and its applications.
At the same time, users should have a system that allows
them to share and use their credentials in a simple and
secure way, as has been proposed, for example, in [21].
Any communication must guarantee the reliability of each
party, especially between unknown and untrustworthy parties. It is therefore necessary to have entities that guarantee
this reliability throughout the communication process. This
requires the development of a system that can be easily used
by any user. It is in this spirit that electronic certificates
were created. The basic function of a certificate is to bind
a public key generated by a Certification Authority (CA)
to a specific and unique user. The certificates are public
and widely distributed by CAs, which makes each CA a
primary element in the certificate creation and distribution
processes. Each CA must validate each issued certificate,
not only between users (by validating the identity of each
user) but also between the user and the issuer of his
certificate, which means the availability of a storage server
where the certificate associated with the public key of each
user is stored. It is therefore impossible to have a single
issuer capable of securing all the certificates generated.
Furthermore, it is almost impossible to have one entity
capable of managing the issuance of all the certificates in the
world. It is also important to have a standard for certificates
to create the smoothest possible communication. This is how
the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and the X.509 certificate
standard were created. [22] [23] [24].
The PKI is the hierarchical infrastructure that supports
the distribution of certificates on the Internet [25]. It is
essentially a hierarchically structured and layered set of
CAs, where the issuing CA (the one that creates the user’s
certificate) is certified by a higher CA. The highest CA is
known as the Root CA. This pyramid structure, known as
the "Certificate Chain of trust", allows each user’s certificate
to be considered valid on the Internet. It is impossible to
have a single root CA, so there are trust links between the
Root CAs, known as Trust Anchors, through which users
can be validated among the Root CAs without needing to
be registered in each Root CA. In addition, the chain of trust
must not only validate active certificates but also distribute
invalid or expired certificates to each CA in the hierarchy.
To facilitate this task, there are structures called Certificate
Revocation Lists (CRLs) [26]. The CRLs are stored in
the same pyramid structure of the CA, and users must not
only purchase a valid certificate but also a CRL, which
checks whether other certificates are still valid. PKIs are the
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fundamental structures that enable secure communications
on the Internet.
The main security threat of a PKI is that the entire
structure is a centralized and pyramidal core, making the
certificate validation system dependent on a hierarchical
structure. This is because the higher the failure in the
pyramid, the more certificates and identities could be compromised. But this is not the only possible security flaw;
the PKI is susceptible to compromise by any of its major
components [27]. Any failure of a PKI component can
cause chains of trust or trust anchors to fail, leaving final
certificates unable to be validated. Any identity that cannot
be validated is considered fraudulent, making it impossible
to create a secure communication channel or establish trust
between unknown and distrustful Internet parties.
A. OVERVIEW

The classical design of PKI presents several security flaws
[27]. Thus, there are several works that aim to improve
its design. The properties of blockchain technology and
its derivatives present a solution to some of the problems
of PKI, in particular the transparency of certificates and
the elimination of a single point of failure. As described
in [13] and [28], blockchain has many features used in
Blockchain 3.0 to implement decentralised applications for
many Internet uses. As for the identity management, the
main idea is to generate a system that can store and manage
identities with all the advantages of a decentralised ledger.
To achieve this goal, blockchain-related identity management implementations and WoT share one very important
feature: the consensus protocol [29]. Miners or validators
(depending on the type of blockchain used) and older users
on WoT, while creating the blocks, validate and secure the
identity storage of each user accessing the ledger. However,
there is one important difference: in WoT, the so-called
consensus is performed by the older users, not by the
network itself. For this reason, a group of malicious users
can hijack the network by acting as a pseudo-CA and corrupt
the whole validity of the network [30] [31]. Contrarily,
in a blockchain network, if the transaction (the creation
or modification of a user’s certificate) is valid (it meets
the parameters defined for creating a block, such as the
hash or Merkle tree specifications), miners or validators
add the block to the ledger without modifying the internal
information of the transaction or interacting with the new
block outside the defined consensus algorithm. This means
that the blockchain acts not only as a decentralised ledger
but also as a neutral ledger, where users do not depend on
the validation of others to create or use their certificates.
In addition, the security features of the blockchain have
some additional considerations compared to PKI implementations, [13] [28] [32]. The transparency property, for
example, makes it possible to know and verify every transaction made by the user and stored in the blockchain. In
other words, each certificate (which is a “human" way of
representing an identity based on a public key paradigm) is

public and can be searched and viewed without any special
access or authorisation. Moreover, the immutability property
of the blockchain, which makes it impossible to alter or
modify any certificate already stored, makes a blockchainbased PKI not only extremely public (fully transparent
by design), but also completely immutable, even for the
certificate owner. Indeed, this property can also pose a
problem for a traditional PKI; the need to revoke certificates. In a blockchain-based PKI, each stored certificate is
immutable, which means that each stored certificate cannot
be unloaded, discarded, or the owner cannot lose access
to it. Although certificates cannot be modified or deleted
from the blockchain, the functionality of a smart-contract
allows users to “replace" their own certificates or stored
information without affecting previously stored data [33].
This means that when a certificate becomes obsolete or
rogue, it can be declared invalid by the owner himself by
creating a new certificate with the same information of the
original one, which will be stored in a new block and the
only one considered valid since the moment of its creation.
The previous certificate will never be deleted or changed,
but the new one will explain that it is the only valid one for
current and future transactions. For a decentralised PKI, this
feature eliminates the need for a CRL or the need for another
related system that could be hijacked or become rogue for
malicious users [27]. In fact, the immutability of blockchain
also provides a transparent and always-available way to keep
a record of every transaction made in the PKI. Auditability
and accountability are important considerations for any PKI,
and blockchain technology offers a natural solution that
allows the migration of all features from a centralised and
insecure environment to a new decentralised environment
where the reliability of the entire system does not rely on
one authority or group of users, but on the network itself
and all of its capabilities.
B. EXISTING PROPOSALS/SOLUTIONS

All the considerations presented in the previous section leads
to different solutions related not only to the concepts of
a blockchain-based or blockchain-related PKI, but also to
identity and certificate management. This means that it is
important to understand the overall representation of PKI
and blockchain in various studies, proposals and prototypes.
To gather the information needed to conduct this analysis,
the research was structured as follows:
• It was delimited between 2016 (according to [11],
the concept of identity management blockchain-based
systems appears in 2016, and that date was reflected
in the paper search) and 2021 (the last search was
conducted on June 11, 2021).
• The search string used was “PKI and Blockchain", to
know all existing works published on both technologies.
• The works related to the Internet of Things (IoT)
were excluded, as identity-related IoT has a different
treatment of people’s certificates.
3
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The surveys found in the search process [4] [5] [6] [7]
[8] [9] [10] [11] were excluded for the implementation
analysis because they did not explain new developments on the subject, but analyses of the state-of-theart. Those surveys were instead used as a theoretical
basis for this survey.
All analysed proposals are full related on how PKI developments are evolving from the centralised CA paradigm
basis. However, each proposal and prototype takes distance
from the centralised origin depending on its operating
objective. Therefore, we have divided each analysed work
according to its implementation, as follows:
•

1) Theoretical developments

The theoretical developments of blockchain and of its
derivatives provide new ways in which the system works and
extend the way blockchain is implemented. The developments presented in our survey focus on identity management
implementations and how blockchain could be used to
improve the decentralisation of PKI technologies. Sato et
al. [34], for example, present a new cryptographic approach
that is useful when some users’ keys are compromised.
Compromised keys can allow attackers to implement double
spending or fraudulent branches on the ledger. Consequently, the new approach needs a Centralised Timestamp
Authority to create a long-term signature scheme based on
Proof of Existence (PoE), which replaces PoW, creating
a consensus system based on the order of transaction
execution. To store the hashes created by the long-term
signatures, a parallel branch must be created and used as
a comparison entity. Over the signatures conservation, Zhao
et al. [35] created a new system that unifies the ECDSA
(Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) and Schnorr
and Rho signature schemes in a single protocol as aggregate
signatures over generic curves. It is worth noting that the
aggregate signature differs from multi-signature in that the
latter is a signature over another one in the same document.
The main idea of the aforementioned new system is to
validate the information stored in the block by checking the
aggregate signatures (i.e. the block will be rejected if the
signatures are invalid or repeated from previous blocks).
This system aims to reduce the signature time compared
to the creation of blocks in the Bitcoin blockchain and
in the blockchains in general. As for the integration of
X.509 environment over Bitcoin-based blockchain schemes,
Konoplev et al. [36] presents a theoretical development
over how X.509 certificates can be decentralised with a
blockchain using sets and function definitions. This work
aims to prove that blockchain so it can support the storage of
certificates, even when the theoretical affirmations omit the
creation and revocation of certificates in their demonstration.
Not all theoretical developments are focused on current
technologies. An et al. [37] proposes a pseudo-decentralised
PKI with blockchain that will be able to resist post-quantum
attacks based on Shore quantum-related algorithms. Quantum and post-quantum cryptography schemes are beyond

the scope of the present survey; however, the main idea is
to use a classical CAs and x.509v3 certificates to create a
user’s certificates and store them in a blockchain without any
consensus protocol, but only with mathematical structures.
Theoretically, the proposed blockchain will be embedded
with quantum cryptography features. It aims to create a
hierarchical CRL system for the blockchain-related CAs,
and also of an additional timestamped validation to keep
tracking of every certificate stored on that blockchain. This
theoretical proposal, however, only explains how to protect
a PKI against attacks that exceed classical and quantum
cryptography.
Table 1 summarises the aforementioned proposed solutions, highlighting the main features and limitations. Moreover, the summary includes on which topic the solution is
oriented and if there is any implementation in addition to
their theoretical presentation. Even when these approaches
are related to identity and decentralisation, it is important
to give them a different treatment from the practical applications explained in the following section.
2) Practical developments

The most important part of this survey depends on how
blockchain is used to improve pseudo and full decentralisation concerning identity management. PKI systems could be
implemented with blockchain in different ways. To classify
the reviewed proposals, we have divided them according to
their implementation, as follows:
a: Classical PKI Systems improved with blockchain

This classification shows pseudo-decentralised implementation where traditional CAs are the main part of the
implementation to generate the PKI system, besides the use
of blockchain. For example, Kakei et al. [38] present crosscertification system for CAs on a PKI based on Hyperledger
blockchain. This proposal uses three layers for PKI: 1) users,
where all CA existent users are registered, 2) CAs, where
all the classic CAs communicate with each other, and 3)
the ledger, consisting of entities known as meta-CAs, which
functions as the Hyperledger nodes. Layer three stores all
the cross-certification references. The Meta-CAs are special
CAs themselves, where all the CAs-related certificates are
created; creating a trust environment similar to the trust anchor of the classic PKI. The Meta-CAs also trust each other
based on a ranking system, in which the most trustworthy
Meta-CA is the best ranked one. This proposal creates a
system where the transparency of certificate transactions
is secured and could be used for all the registered users.
Similar to this proposal, Zhao et al. [39] present a system
where the cycle of life of each certificate is stored inside a
smart contract, while the certificate itself is still stored on
the CA side. This means that each certificate has its own
smart contract with related metadata to check the certificate
validity, not only with the CA, but with the CRL instead.
In this proposal, the smart contracts are integrated to the
PKI to have a full validation of each certificate since its
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TABLE 1: Summary - Reviewed Theoretical Works
Reference

Oriented to

[34]

Long-term digital signature.

[35]

Secure blockchain via
signatures.

[36]

User authentication.

[37]

Secure PKI.

Main Features
Validation of blockchain blocks
based on Proof of Existence,
where long-term Digital Signature
is based on two PoE.
Unified concepts of signature algorithms in an algorithm of partial
signatures for bitcoin blockchain,
in order to reduce signature and
validation time.
PKI decentralised model scheme
for a blockchain standard version
with X.509 certificates.
PKI model designed to resist
post-quantum
cryptographic
attacks with blockchain validation
schemes.

creation. Another approach created for web-page services
is presented by Garba et al. [40], where the domain owners
use both CAs and Registration Authorities (RA) to build
a blockchain network where the smart contracts store the
certificates created after the request made to RAs, which,
along with the CAs, are the only entities that can create
the smart contracts and validate the information to avoid
impersonation between the domain owners. The works of
Wang et al. [41] make an improvement over the classical
CA, keeping the generation of certificates centralised, but
the identities of users and their correspondent certificates
in two independent blockchains, managed by the CAs of
the network as the nodes of the system. In this case, the
consensus protocol is defined by the node administrator in
the network. Another approach is presented by Wang et
al. [42], where, with an Ethereum implementation, the web
pages-related certificates are created by the CA, validating
the identity of the server through the DNS system. The purpose is to keep transparency of transactions and revocations
of certificates without omitting the CRL system. However,
this proposal keeps the transparency of the transactions in
one block per certificate, all the system adds overheads
and delays in the transactions between the server and the
blockchain. The proposal of Fu et al. [43], on the other
hand, consists of dividing the emulation of the network on
volunteer nodes (called mini-CAs), acting as a blockchain
to create a distributed pseudo-CA. Each node performs
identity validation for a transaction fee. Despite this pseudodecentralisation, each node must validate all transactions in
the network, as Bitcoin does with these currency transactions.
To avoid Bitcoin’s congestion, Guo et al. [44] created a
system where the identity is considered as a set of attributes
that need to be validated to achieve identity management.
Thanks to the smart contract of the Ethereum blockchain,
this approach implements a token validation system, where
each valid attribute generates a specific token and each
information owner grants access to its tokens to other users.

Consensus
Protocol

Limitations

Current Applicability

Depends on Timestamp Authority
to validate the PoE, in blockchain
restored only the consensus hash.

PoE.

Not defined.

Based on Bitcoin blockchain, improves transactions and their storage, not the identity of the issuers.

PoW.

Designed to
be integrated
over Bitcoin.

PoW.

Not defined.

Not
Presented.

Not defined.

Mathematical and algorithmic
model, without implementation.
No CRL in the design.
Depends on classic CAs to manage
identities, almost a centralised system without consensus algorithm
and a CRL leader.

In this case, the CA does not act as an identity manager,
but rather as an attribute manager, where information is
validated by the private key of the information owner and the
information user. This prevents MITM attacks. The works
of Longo et al. [45] aim to create a decentralised network
of CAs, where each CA keeps its properties and become
the blockchain nodes to store the certificates the CAs have
created. The idea is to create a certificate chain to replace
the classical blocks where the CA certificate acts like the
first certificate i, which issues the first user’s certificate
i+1, which issues the second user certificate in the chain
i+2, and so on. This theoretical approach keeps the security
on the intermediate certificates as if those certificates were
classical blockchain blocks. However, the proposal does not
implement a CRL system for the certificates in the chain.
b: Modified classical PKI systems

This section explains several approaches of decentralised
and pseudo-decentralised identity environments where classical CAs are still an important part of the network, but
blockchain and its applications build a new paradigm of
decentralised management.
Yan et al. [46] present a system for mobile devices,
where the identity of each device is predefined by the
manufacturer or acquired by the device from a CA based on
some identity feature like the IP of the device. This system,
based on X.509v3 certificates, has several types of nodes,
differentiating from validators to transactional nodes. Even
when the ID of the device is fixed by the International
Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI), a CA is required to
validate the identity of the device. While the proposal keeps
the classical infrastructure, it omits in its design the CRL
to revoke the certificates. Considering the decentralisation
of the identity management as a complement to the classic
infrastructure, the proposal of Li et al. [18] compares an
identity management system with and without CAs. The
revocation of certificates is based on external parties. Without the CA, each identity must be verified by internal older
5

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI
10.1109/ACCESS.2022.3145156, IEEE Access

users, like WoT. In both systems, the blockchain stores the
transactions between the certificates and not the certificates
themselves for tracking purposes.
On the other hand, the proposal of Quin et al. [17]
considers the interactions of certificates created by a CA
as currency to be transacted in a Bitcoin-based blockchain,
using Merkle Patricia trees as a certificate storage system.
In this approach, the identity of the user can be modified,
and each user can also have more than one certificate for his
interactions. In this case, the verification of the validity of
each certificate is performed by the number of interactions
of each certificate, and the existence of the certificate and
the related identity for its revocation. Thinking of signatures,
the works of Guo et al. [47] establish a theoretical system
where through a Key Management Center (KMC) a user
can generate a key pair and store the public one into a
blockchain. The main idea is to use the security features
of the blockchain to secure each public key signed by the
KMC with the ElGamal signature system. For this proposal,
the private key remains with the user for all interactions.
A novel technology called Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) automatises the issuance of
certificates. With those concepts working the proposals of
Dykcik et al. [48] and Kfoury et al. [49]. The proposal
in [48] is designed to validate DNS names on the Internet
using a tandem of multi-signatures, a blockchain and ACME
technology. Per domain the network it creates a specific
smart contract where all the interactions of the domain are
stored. Each certificate is issued by a CA-like system based
on ACME, which fulfils the same functions as a classical
CA, and validates the certificates based on the approval of
a minimal number of network nodes. The CRL is not based
on revocation but in the generation of new partial signatures
when the domain pays the corresponding renewal fee. On
one hand, [49] creates an Ehtereum-based ACME system
to verify the x.509 certificates issued for web domains. In
this case, the certificates can be issued by the web server or
by a registered CA. The idea is also to keep a registration
of the transactions of the Web servers with their clients
using Oracle services as a secure channel. On the other
hand, the proposal of Yakubov et al. [30] discusses the
idea of turning smart-contracts into CAs, enabling the smart
contract to issue certificates for each user in the network. In
this case, the PKI is smart contract-related by default, where
certificates exist as creation cases of smart contracts. In
addition, the new PKI creates another type of smart contract,
which acts as a CRL, keeping the valid certificates in a
whitelist (i.e. a structure, where all the members are valid
or trustworthy). All this is done to emulate the decentralised
functions of the blockchain, while keeping the functions
of classical PKIs. A similar approach is presented in the
proposal by Li et al. [50], where CAs act as the nodes of the
blockchain, and smart contracts store the certificate chain for
each certificate issued. The novelty of this proposal lies in
the QoS approach, because it proposes a series of economic
punishments and rewards for CAs based on their relative

behaviour regarding the users.
Boontaetae et al. [22] present a system called Real Digital
Identity (RDI), where the identity issuers are a set of public
and private organisms and bureaus where the identity of
the users is created, and the CA only issues the certificate
requested by a user through this set of entities. The trustworthiness of the identity comes from the combination of all
user features provided by the entities in tandem, which act
as a tree where the nodes are the partial identity entities and
the branches are the users requesting their certificates. This
proposal claims ownership of physical or virtual assets that
are stored in these entities that can be banks, universities,
government offices, etc. Finally, in this section, Ahmed et al.
[51] propose a system that is called Smart Contract-based
PKI (SCP). This proposal uses Ethereum smart contracts to
enforce the identity of Web servers through their definitions
on DNS services, using CAs as a trust signing servers, and
also the nodes of the blockchain. The blockchain in this
proposal does not store the certificate or their transactions,
but the trust policies are defined by the CA for each
certificate issued to achieve certificate transparency.
c: Decentralised PKI systems with blockchain

This section explains all the proposals that avoid using a
CA as a main part of the identity management and aim to
create a full decentralised system using blockchain.
The works of Patsonakis et al. [52] and its update [53]
present a decentralised PKI (DPKI) built from smart contracts that could evolve without generating new branches
and also keeping the size of the smart contract inside
the blockchain. This design, however, could be called a
“Naming Service”, because can be used to decentralise
DNS services or other services that can be stored into a
smart contract. The main contribution of this proposal is
the introduction of a cryptographic accumulator: a public
additive system that allows to know if an element is part of
the initial input of the accumulator (if the evaluated element
was accumulated). In this case, the accumulator is based on
RSA, meaning that it is necessary to use a TTP to keep
the accumulator in the network. The accumulator is used
to ensure some transparency over the transactions of the
certificates stored in the DPKI.
A similar approach is presented by Axon et al. [54] and it
is updated by Plessing et al. [55], where a blockchain-based
PKI (PB-PKI) is implemented using a fork of CertCoin
[56]. This approach improves the anonymity of the network
by disassociating the user’s identity from the certificate in
order to generate pseudo-obscure identity management. This
no-linking process also appears on the key update process.
However, as it is shown in [55], the total-anonymity concept
cannot be achieved directly because the dissociation could
lead to identity impersonation. To counteract the weaknesses
of PB-PKI, Plessing proposes two additional solutions that
are integrated directly in the proposal [54]: a cryptographic
asynchronous accumulator (that is based on Merkle trees)
and a ring of signatures for the certificates. Mostly, the
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accumulator built a Merkle tree while the input elements are
accumulated. To improve the storage space of the tree, the
intermediate elements are deleted and only the final state is
preserved to validation. These improvements make PB-PKI
safer and more secure.
Another proposal of decentralised management is presented by Sermpinis et al. [19] in a proposal called DeTract.
This proposal allows the web servers to create their own
X.509 certificates with uPort, an Ethereum-based identity
storage platform, which links physical and Ethereum smart
contract addresses, as an identity manager. The deployed
blockchain has stored the hash of each certificate with its
associated identity while the actual certificates have been
stored off-chain. Each transaction must be paid for by the
nodes, in Ethereum’s gas currency. Each certificate transaction (creation, update, revocation) is performed by the
network using the acquired addresses when the user (a web
server, in this case) creates their certificate and asks for their
storage, obviating the need for a CRL or another centralised
system. Another decentralised approach is presented by
Toorani et al. [57], that creates a blockchain-based WoT-like
system in order to avoid the centralised CRL. This system
creates three user types, called units: 1) root, assumed
to be honest in all the network developing and a fixed
trust definition, 2) intermediates, having a trust definition
equal to one, are the units which participate in the network
transactions (enrol, update, revocation), and 3) ordinaries,
having a trust definition equal to zero, are the users of
the network that request the validation and revocation of
their certificates. For this proposal, each unit generates its
own key pairs and requests to store the public keys into the
blockchain to the intermediate units. If ordinary units have
the approval of several intermediate units, their keys can be
transacted and stored in the blockchain. Otherwise, ordinary
units must wait for the approval of the network.
In the proposal of Han et al. [58], the nodes of the
blockchain are used as trusted issuers and this trustworthiness (based on a system of relative signatures) allows the
creation of a user’s certificates. Each certificate is created as
a chain of validation from a user-created self-key. This new
certificate is distributed between the network and the nodes
sign this certificate creating the chain of validations. Only
when the nodes have validated the certificate, it is stored in
the ledger. It is important to mention that this system works
with a limited number of users, in order to improve the speed
of certificate generation and validation. On the proposal of
Dua et al. [59], it is defined another WoT-like network where
the blockchain is used as PGP’s signature rings. Based on
Ethereum, every identity must have an Ethereum address
to interact with the network. In this case, the certificates
remain in the network while the signatures of the certificates
can be revoked or updated, where the revocation of the
signatures and the creation of new ones being an attribute
of every certificate smart contract. This meaning that the
identities cannot be revoked, only the signatures associated
with the identities. Another WoT-like proposal is presented

by Schaerer et al. [60], where using a specific Distributed
Ledger Technology (DLT) creates a decentralised system
that uses graphs to relate identities with their correspondent
public keys. This proposed DLT is not lineal (not in chain)
but like a tree where the nodes are the stored public keys. To
store a new public key, that key must have been invited to
the network and be validated by the currently stored public
keys. The revocation, on the other hand, depends only on the
public key owner. In the same line of thought, and finishing
with these WoT-like proposals, the proposal of Anada et
al. [61] presents a WoT-like system that uses the modulus
elements of RSA where the value N (the multiplication of
the two prime numbers p and q defined by RSA theory)
of the key pair creation is associated directly with the user
identity. This N modulus is used both to validate the key
generation, which is going to be stored in the network,
and to prove that the identity-related key is available to be
approved for the older users in a WoT. This mathematical
approach creates a decentralised trusted type network for
identity storage.
About other approaches, the proposal of Yang et al. [62]
presents the creation of a system where information will be
protected on the nodes directly, not just in the communication link. This is a solution for the Named Defined Network
(NDN), where each user needs a specific name instead of
a classic IP address, and for validation, each network name
is linked to a cryptographic signature. These two attributes
(the network name and the signature) allow users to identify
themselves in the network where the blockchain stores the
keys of each network name (as a user or a web server). The
validation of each transaction requires 51% of all nodes to
consider the transactions as valid, and each node manages
an individual blockchain where its own keys are stored to
share them with the network. In addition, Tewari et al. [23],
with a private and not fully decentralised blockchain, create
an identity that does not depend on the user or a centralised
entity, but on a set of distributed attributes acquired from
various public entities. This system also uses the blockchain
to avoid the use of a CRL with timestamped certificates.
In this case, instead of using a username and password
to validate the users, the registration uses a One-Time-Pad
identity validation. Finally, in this section, the proposal of Li
et al. [63] creates a ring of signatures based on RSA. The
main idea is to use the cryptographic features of RSA to
manage the registration and update of the certificates without
compromising the register key (the one used to create the
original key pair). This development protects the privacy of
the users hiding their ID over successive updates where the
new public key is related to a pseudonymous stored in the
blockchain.
d: PKI revocation system management

This section explains the improvements, not only
CA specifically, but in the CRL mechanism. The
of Elloh Adja et al. [64] describe an improvement
validity mechanism on X.509 based on distribution

in the
works
of the
points
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to improve the high time delays of blockchain implementations. In this solution, which aims to be fully integrated
with X.509 environment distributions in the future, CAs
store in the blockchain the revocation information of each
issued certificate. These certificates, usually deployed in
the context of TLS protocol, are issued by the CAs and
maintain the centralised structure of the network. One major
improvement for this approach is the client verification for
the Web server certificate that is sent on the same channel of
the secure data, improving the time of the communication
since its beginning for all the systems. Another proposal
[65] suggests maintaining the current CA infrastructure by
improving the revocation system. This proposal can be used
for Web servers or personal users equally. The members
of the PKI are the nodes of the blockchain and the smart
contracts store the validation of each certificate. All of
this is to improve the delays between the server and the
user during a TLS connection. Finally, in this section, the
proposal of San et al. [66] creates a method based on the
Bitcoin blockchain to replace the CRL system, where the
information of revocation is stored in the blockchain through
a mining work. This system cannot be considered as a PKI,
it is only a CRL replacement, where the revocation and the
reissuing of certificates is performed through a credential
check initiated by the owner, where new IDs are assigned
by a CA.
e: CA transparency and auditability

This section explains the works related to the use of
blockchain, not for decentralising the identity management,
but rather for improving PKI’s transparency and auditability.
The works of Chen et al. [67], for example, proposed
a layered system called CertChain, in which CAs always
create and manage user identities, and a Bitcoin blockchainbased system controls the behaviour of the certificate as
a log server. CertChain uses all registered nodes with the
highest computing power as “miners", which creates a centralised miner system within the blockchain. Additionally,
the verification of the certificate behaviour is done in real
time, which avoids the presence of a third-party verifier
in the whole system. Another example focused on web
page identity is proposed by Madala et al. [15], where a
smart contract-based blockchain is used as a database that
replaces Google Certificate Environment. This system has
CAs as nodes that feed the ledger with certificate chain
references. The full certificate information is stored outside
the chain (off-chain). To break the security of this proposal,
an attacker needs to compromise at least 51% of the CAs in
the network to validate the aggregation of new certificates
or the signature request. The 51% attack [28] is the only
vulnerability according to the Authors. However, that attack
is impossible in this case because only the CAs in the
network can make this kind of request.
The work presented by Kubilay et al. [68], named CertLedger, proposes a system where a blockchain is used to
replace the certificate validation and revocation logs and the

CRL, avoiding any CRL spoofing and preserving the entire
secure channels since the beginning of the communication.
The main idea of this proposal lies on using smart contracts
to keep secure all transactions from Web servers’ certificates. All of this to prevent the information breach or hijack
considering that the classical CAs that create and maintain
the certificates can become rogue, or the blockchain could
be under the 51% attack. Consequently, the actual security
of the system lies in the cryptographic primitives of the
architecture.
To keep CAs working properly, the proposal of Matsumoto et al. [69], called Instant Karma PKI (IKP), uses
a blockchain as a behavioural control system to incentive
good behaviour from the CAs in the network. In this case,
the concept ‘good behaviour’ implies the correct issuing
of certificates from the CA (certificates without errors of
validation, information or assignment). This means that CAs
need to maintain SLA and QoS levels to avoid what the
clients call a ‘bad reputation’, that would relegate the CA to
the back of the PKI queue for generating new certificates.
Another system in which the blockchain is used as a log
ledger is presented in [70], where a new public PKI for
Peru is presented. This PKI defines a hierarchy of four types
of certificates that are generated by a local CA with RSArelated technologies that are not compatible (at the time of
publication) with international certification standards.
In [71], the blockchain is used as a decentralised name
server for client-server transactions and identity requests. In
this case, the blockchain is used only to store the identity
relationship between domains as a related, but without
integrating a query system. Finally, in this section, another
proposal of a log-related blockchain [72], called blockchainrelated PKI (BKI), is designed to be a log manager. In
other words, the blockchain stores the transaction logs of
the certificates, not the certificates themselves. Instead of
using a consensus protocol, the transactions are validated
by a Merkle tree, and every transaction has a timestamp
with second precision. The idea was developed to avoid a
malicious party from modifying the keys of the systems,
and hence, to even hijacking the CA. For this proposal,
only owners and registered users in BKI can perform each
interaction, where the entire system is timestamped.
f: User-related PKI management

In this section, we explain several proposals of management systems that are more focused on how the user
interacts with decentralised networks. Although maintains
their relationship with the concepts of identity decentralisation. For example, the works in [20] create a system
to protect consortium blockchains so that the stored data
is no longer transparent. Using a joint system defined for
various members of a consortium, the contribution of this
proposal is to create a blockchain network that could store
the metadata in a safe manner using some homomorphic
cryptosystem that is still related to RSA. Another approach
for user-centric systems is presented by [73], who proposes
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a blockchain-based transparent and trustworthy third-party
system to create a secure logging-based framework. The
development in this proposal is based on the evaluation
of specific algorithms and their experimental execution. In
other words, the transactions made by TTPs over some
systems have a transparency blockchain to improve the
users’ knowledge about the TTP transparency. All of that
while the privacy of the certificates and the identities related
to them is kept. Moreover, clients and users need to interact
with blockchain-based PKI systems.
The works in [74] propose a light mobile client, written
in Java, to interconnect users with their PKIs. This client,
however, is limited to Certcoin-based PKIs. The main idea
of Certcoin, defined in [56], is to create a blockchain to
securely store users’ identities with his related public keys.
The client aids to create two private keys (online and
offline) to emulate the security implemented in CertCoin.
This thin-client performance seems to be more efficient
when compared to other existing schemes. Finally, in this
section, another proposal is presented in [75]. The proposal
describes a system where the identity is based on managermanaged tuples created on hierarchical multi-graphs and
then stored on a blockchain. From the blockchain paradigm,
this approach acquires security parameters and a pseudodomain service system that manages all stored tuples to
validate the identity of each user.
Table 2 summarises the ideas presented in this section,
with their main features and limitations of decentralised
PKI approaches. The summary also includes on what section
the studied proposal is classified, what topic is oriented the
solution and if the solution has planted some form of selfgenerated or self-signed identity.
III. NEW TRENDS ANALYSIS

Figure 1 shows the classification of the different solutions
and proposals about decentralised identity management. As
shown in Tables 1 and 2, there are several approaches of how
Identity Management as a concept must be implemented
and developed. However, we can group them on what final
problem they have been designed to solve, all in the context
of the Blockchain 3.0 paradigm.
For this analysis, we focus on the practical developments
of decentralisation, where user management is the most
important feature needed to be improved. However, as it
is shown on [7], the broad implementation of centralised
systems and x.509 format make it more important to develop
solutions to improve and evolve the classic CA infrastructure. Sections II-B2a and II-B2b explains how blockchain
is used to bring some transparency over the creation and/or
the life cycle of the certificate. Each of these proposals,
however, always depends on CA, either for the creation of
the identity or of a related certificate. One of the main features of these solutions is the existence and use of the CRL
to maintain the registration of the revoked certificates. For
these developments, a concept of self-generated certificates
or identities does not exist, maybe with the exception of

[49], that have some self-signed certificates, but not as a
main feature of the proposals. The main goal of the proposals presented on sections II-B2a and II-B2b is to improve the
mechanism of how PKI works, introducing decentralisation
as a supplementary improvement, but without modifying the
inner core in what all the CAs work. The primary limitation
of the works described in section II-B2a is their reliance on
a traditional centralized infrastructure, including CRL, to
maintain the validity of each certificate. In comparison, the
works described in section II-B2b introduce modifications
to the traditional PKI infrastructure to include a blockchain
in the core of the PKI network, in an attempt to create
the closest thing to a decentralized network. However, this
creates some limitations when CAs are used as nodes in
the blockchain, in order to create a smart contract related to
network security, which may affect the interactions between
users and nodes: users and nodes that were created on a
centralized paradigm. Indeed, all of the above means that
the implementations presented in section II-B2b still rely
on TTPs to maintain system reliability.
A major improvement in PKI, over what was studied
in sections II-B2a and II-B2b, is presented in section
II-B2c, where the concept of CA and centralisation is
avoided with several approaches of blockchain implementation. From certificate-storing blockchain to dual systems
to hashes/certificates, the studied proposals allow clients to
have a decentralised way to interact with their users (when
the users are Web servers), or in a standalone communication. Most of these approaches, however, are designed to
emulate the main features of WoT [29] [31]: a group of
older network users act as validators/enablers of new users
on the network. Despite the well-known capabilities of decentralisation of WoT or any of their studied variations, the
possibility that the network can be hijacked and maliciously
centralised persists. This vulnerability must be considered,
because it is one of the most important impediments to
achieving full decentralisation.
The sections II-B2d and II-B2e show improvements focused on the transparency of PKI. The decentralisation of
CRL systems allow to keep track of the behaviour of both
the certificates and the PKI itself. All of that to maintain
the blockchain offered transparency. Even when some of
these proposals cannot be considered as PKI per se, their
approaches provide the user with the security of knowing
how the certificates were generated. That means what their
status of operation is and establishment of the connection
(especially when it is between the user and a Web server
via TLS) and most importantly what their revocation status
is. All this to prevent rogue users/certificates from putting
all the identity system in danger. However, the emphasis
on transparency in these sections makes these proposals
vulnerable to the fact that they are not necessarily applicable
to decentralized environments, or that they only serve to enhance traditional CA schemes. This means that they do not
contribute to the decentralization of identity management as
such.
9
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FIGURE 1: Summary of New Trends

Finally, the section II-B2f presents proposals where the
user and their interaction with the network is the main objective. This section explains the security that users can achieve
with determinate proposals, and how the user must interact
with the network through specific clients or encryption to
keep their identity secure and safe. However, these proposals
are limited only to specific applications of blockchain, which
makes it difficult to implement them in other scenarios or
in other decentralized systems, even if they share some
management characteristics.
This survey analysed 55 works, everyone with different
scopes. All of them give an explanation on how blockchain
is used to enable the desired decentralisation in identity
management. However, most of these works fail to present a
decentralisation of identity itself. This means that in almost
all cases, there is an entity that creates or issues the identity
based on x.509 certificates. The proposals [49], [19], [57],
[58] and [63] are the only ones that address the possibility
of the creation of an identity by the user himself. As far as
we know, there is no project or implementation where users
are able to create their own identities; and to be capable of
validating it without any entity or without depending on a
group of users to have a valid identity.
Other kinds of implementations, known as Self-Sovereign
Identity (SSI) systems [76] [77] cannot be included in this
survey. Even when SSI considers some form of decentralised
identity, it does not work as a PKI (infrastructure to keep
and store certificates) in their interactions with the users. The
SSI decentralisation is mostly based on mobile devices and
their interactions with a blockchain. Besides, the common
study fields that all the works shared, it is important to add

the user’s independence and self-validation techniques to
achieve a full decentralised system, where users can be selfrepresented without the need of entities who tell them who
they are, with or without a payment for that service.
IV. CONCLUSION

The analysis of the current trends on the application of
blockchain in identity management proves that the technology is used basically like a log of other identity interactions. Most of the works included in this survey show
the importance that CA still has when identity is created
or used on the Internet. It means that users still depend
on third parties (trusted or distrusted, paid or free) to have
an actual identity on the network. This implies that current
identity systems cannot handle or allow users to create their
identities with the features that the users consider significant.
To either keep their privacy in online transactions or to
securely show who they are. Part of the future works lies
on understanding how the actual identity decentralisation
could use blockchain as a tool to build an infrastructure
that supports all the features studied, including self-created
identities. The analysis presented through this survey will be
used to build a system where each user will be able to create,
manage and validate a self-identity, with the parameters of
identification that the user chooses to share and that the
network will recognise them as valid.
The step to turn users’ identities as autonomous and decentralised is the cornerstone of new and fully decentralised
Internet services and the first step on how we must need to
understand our relationship with the Internet in the future.
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TABLE 2: Summary - Reviewed Practical Works
Related Concept

Ref.

[38]
Classical PKI
Systems

[39]

[40]

Modified classical
PKI systems

Consensus
Protocol

User Defined
Identity

Not
defined

No

Not
defined

No

The systems depends on CAs and
RAs for each transaction

PoW

No

A CA generates all the certificates
as an administrator, which defines
the consensus method.

Administrator
No
defined

Each browser keeps some headers
to validate if chain certificates are
stored in the blockchain.

PoW

No

Based on Bitcoin features, each
node (volunteers) need to validate
the work of the previous miners.

PoW

No

The system differentiates request
contract from store contract, and
owner and user of information,
with wildcards comparison.

PoS

Based
on
data,
not
direct
identities

Users create the certificate chain,
but a CRL-like system is not defined.

Not applicable

No

Not specified

No

Not specified

No

PoW, MPT

No

Not Specified

No

PoW

No

PoW

Could have
self-signed
certificates

Not specified

No

PoS

No

PoW

No

PoW

No

Oriented to

Main Features

Limitations

CAs validation

Distributed CA implementation for
validation of CAs using Hyperledger as transparency core.

CA
transparency

RootCA transparency system to
manage the certificate life cycle

WoT-like trust between the metaCAs, which generate the cross certificates for classical CAs
Depends on a third party storage
system for each certificate. Depends on CA infrastructure for certification issuing

User
registration
validation

Blockchain-based PKI for web
servers to protect the registration of
new users.
PKI on a private blockchain with
identity independent certificates,
divided on two blockchains.
PKI focused on web servers where
validation of identity comes from
DNS servers with certificate issuers
and enablers.
Create a system of mini-CAs to
create and validate distributed CA
identity validation via multilevel
secret sharing.

[41]

User authentication

[42]

Web
servers
Identity

[43]

User authentication

[44]

User authentication

[45]

User authentication

[46]

User authentication

[18]

Certificate storage

[17]

User authentication

[47]

Signature management

[48]

DNS
names
validation

[49]

Web
servers
validation

[30]

User authentication

[50]

User authentication

CA based PKI implemented with
smart-contracts to build the certificate chain.

[22]

User authentication

CA network model with smartcontracts based on Identity authorities as a service provider and issued
by the user.

[51]

Web
servers
identity

Smart-contract based PKI which
work as a parallel PKI system with
QoS definitions.

Distributed CA access control system based on identity attributes
control via smart-contracts
Prototype suite based on x.509 and
blockchain-like ledger to concatenate user certificates with anonymous identities.
PKI designed for mobile devices’
certificates, with self signed certificates via hardware identity.
Design of a Blockchain-based PKI
with and without a CA and analysis
of features.
Bitcoin-Based PKI where certificates are used as an ad-hoc currency designed to protect web
servers.
Blockchain-based KCM to generate keys for certificate generations
and hide the identity of the user.
DNS based PKI with specific CAs
and smart-contracts, one for each
domain. Every SC has a number of
CAs to validate domain servers.
Decentralised
automatic
certificates issuance with Ethereum
to validation of web domains
through x.509 certificates
Framework over blockchain which
uses CAs as smart-contracts and
modified X.509 certificates inside
the smart-contract.

Depends on a Third party to create
the identity (the manufacturer) and
validate the certificate.
Theoretical design which considers
decentralisation as a supplementary
part of a PKI.
Certificate validation is given by
the amount of interactions in the
network.
Theoretical design without specific
integration to any blockchain-based
solution.
Security based on blockchain security. It depends on a minimal
number of nodes (CAs) to validate
the authenticity of the system certificates.
Depends on Oracle services and
CAs to create the certificates and
in the interaction between the user
and the web server
Each certificate is part of a global
SC in order to transmit the chain
of certificates as a classic CA.
Depends on CAs and measures the
behaviour of CAs in order to establish punishments and rewards for
communication links.
Use a validation through majority
system to solve identity validation
between identity authorities with
CAs and service providers with
customised cryptography.
Web vendors establish trust
policies between CA and web
browser(user), that vendor can be
hijacked by a malicious party and
overwrite trust policies between
CAs and smart-contracts.
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Related Concept

Decentralised
PKI systems

Ref.

Oriented to

Main Features

Limitations

[52]

PKI
generic
framework

PKI based system built over smartcontracts based on the access to
public keys with an accumulator.

Theoretical design of a PKI with
fixed long accumulators for improvement of smart-contract behaviour.

[53]

PKI
generic
framework

Update definitions over the works
of [52].

The security of the implementation
is based on the protocol definitions,
also the accumulator needs a TTP
for validation.

[54]

User authentication

Decentralised PKI focused on the
full anonymity of the user in the
system.

[55]

User authentication

Improvements of [54] adding a ring
signature and asynchronous accumulator.

[19]

User authentication

Framework based on Ethereum facilities to keep hashes stored on a
public network with explicit revocation models.

[57]

CRL improvements

WoT-like PKI with user profiles
and security thresholds to store the
public keys inside the blockchain.

[58]

User authentication

Conditional
trust
framework
with certificates chains stored in
blockchain.

[59]

User authentication

P2P storing network based on WoT
using Ethereum to define a decentralised PKI.

[60]

User authentication

[61]

User authentication

[62]

PKI’s revocation
system

CA transparency

Name
networks
communication

[23]

User authentication

[63]

Signature management

[64]

Certificate
validation
improvement

WoT-like tree-designed DLT to
store and manage identities through
identity claims.
Modulus N RSA type PKI to create
a WoT validation with RSA and
ECC as second public transaction
key.
Use of blockchain to manage NDN
communications like DNS communications focusing on solving the
CA compromised problem.
X.509 based PKI with identity
providers and CAs as blockchain
nodes without CRL.
System designed to create a ring
signature based on the primitives
of RSA to protect identities stored
into a blockchain.
Namecoin related system to improve the revocation methods of
x.509 certificates.
Blockchain based system designed
to store the validation and revocation information into smart contracts.

Variation of Certcoin (blockchain
for certificates) without authentication, but without link identity with
certificates.
There are no privacy defined in the
implementation. Also the ring signature need several improvements.
Framework depends on several
features on Ethereum (gas, ethers,
uPort system). Every transaction
is implemented in a generic
Ethereum.
Basic users depend on blockchain
nodes users to store their public
keys. Consensus depends on users
with prefedined trust thresholds.
The security of the system relies
on blockchain classic security. User
number limited by a binomial distribution.
Every identity is based on a
Ethereum address. Use a PGP like
signature ring. The stability of the
network depends on the number of
nodes.
The access to the network is only
by invitation. In the DLT is stored
a hash related public key.

Consensus
Protocol
RSArelated
random
Oracle
model.
RSArelated
random
Oracle
model

User Defined
Identity

No

No

PoW

No
User
identities

PoC

No

Ethereumrelated

Yes

PBFT

Yes

PoW

Yes

Pow

No

DLTdefined

No

Not
Presented

No

PoW

No

PoW

No

Theoretical scheme, not intended
implementation.

Not specified

Partial generation

Not designed for identity decentralisation, intended to be integrated
with classical CAs.

Not specified

Not PKI

Susceptible to DoS attacks.

CONS

Not PKI

The system is not designed to be
implemented in a blockchain directly.
There are multiple blockchains to
control network names. Every node
manages their own blockchain with
their keys.
Works on a private non fully decentralised blockchain. Every identity
must be validated by a CA before
being updated on the blockchain.

[65]

CRL improvements

[66]

CRL management

System designed to revoke certificates through bitcoin blockchain
mining.

Blockchain only for CRL management and improvement. Not designed to manage identities or decentralisation.

PoW

Not PKI

CA behaviour
control
via
blockchain

Audit Scheme for TLS connections
via Blockchain, where CAs manage identity and every transaction
is stored as a block with a Merkle
tree.

A system based only on trusted
CAs as nodes, blockchain stores
certificate transactions, not certificates.

Specific
designed
protocol.
Based on
Ouroboros.

No

[67]
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Related Concept

Ref.

Oriented to

[15]

Web
servers
identity

[68]

User authentication

[69]

Web
servers
identity

Blockchain based system to maintain behavioural control over CAs
in the network.

[70]

User authentication

A new system of hierarchy for signature administration in Peru.

[71]

Log
management

Bitcoin Blockchain based log system acting as a decentralised
trustwhorty name server for a
centralised client-server identity
manager based on CONIKS and
Catena.

[72]

Logs management

Blockchain-based PKI with CAs to
generate key pairs.

[20]

User data privacy

CA transparency

User related
management

[73]
[74]
[75]

Authority trust
User authentication
User authentication

Main Features

Limitations

Hyperledger blockchain which replaces Google Certificate Validator
with a blockchain with trustworthy
CAs as peers.
Certificate management system
where blockchain is used as a
vault for TLS certificates.

The system depends on CAs to
generate certificates for the issuers
(clients) and for security transactions.
Blockchain is used only as a vault,
identity is still created in CA and
certificate chains.
Focused on financial losses,
Ethereum used to store server
failures based on an SLA, where
bad CAs are relegated.
Based on RSAs CA, have problems
with interoperability and some vulnerabilities.

Blockchain network which stored
data over homomorphic cryptography to keep the information private
and accessible.
Trustworthy third party system
based on blockchain to improve
TTP transparency.
Certcoin based application for a
PKI used to users administration.
Tuple system that allows identity
management with identity relations
graphs with blockchain.

Consensus
Protocol

User Defined
Identity

HyperledgerNo
related
PBFT

No

PoW

No

Not
defined

No

Blockchain is used only to manage and store the identity relations
which are stored in a classic centralised system. Both systems are
linked but not interconnected.

PoW

No

Blockchain stores logs instead of
certificates or key pairs, in order to
protect PKI transactions. The systems need a number of CAs in order to be considered compromised.

PoW

No

Only designed for consortium
blockchains, not intended to deploy
on public ones.

Not specified

No

Not specified

No

PoW

No

Graphbased
protocol

No

Transparency designed for TTPs,
not intended to be used for any user
or certificate storage.
Based on Certcoin, keys recovery
made by Shamir parts scheme.
Theoretic approaches based on directed hierarchical multigraphs of
managers-managees.
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